In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO 2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium on the power market that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO 2 emissions released.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to develop analytic tools in order to design a relevant mechanism for carbon markets, where relevant refers to emissions reduction. For this purpose, we focus on electricity producers in a power market linked to a carbon market. The link between markets is established through a market microstructure approach. In this context, where the number of agents is limited, standard game theory applies. The producers are considered as players behaving on the two financial markets represented here by carbon and electricity. We establish a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative J-player game through a coupling mechanism between the two markets.
The original idea comes from the French electricity sector, where the spot electricity market is often used to satisfy peak demand. Producers' behavior is demand driven and linked to the maximum level of electricity production. Each producer strives to maximize its market share. In the meantime, it has to manage the environmental burden associated with its electricity production through a mechanism inspired by the EU ETS (European Emission Trading System) framework: each producer unit of emissions must be counterbalanced by a permit or through the payment of a penalty. Emission permit allocations are simulated through a carbon market that allows the producers to buy allowances at an auction. Our focus on the electricity sector is motivated by its prevalence in the emission share (45% of the whole emission level worldwide), and the introduction in phase III of the EU ETS of an auction-based allowance allocation mechanism. In the present paper, the design assumptions made on the carbon market aim to foster emissions reduction in the entire electricity sector.
Our approach proposes an original framework for the coupling of bidding strategies on two markets. The merit order ranking features marginal cost functions sorted according to their production costs. These are therefore non-decreasing step functions whereby each step refers to the marginal production cost of a specific unit owned by the producer.
The producers trade their electricity on a dedicated market. For a given producer j, the strategy consists of a function that makes it possible to establish an asking price on the electricity market, defined as
where C j the set of marginal production cost functions are explicitly given in the following (see (2.14)); s j (c j (·), q) is the unit price at which the producer is ready to sell quantity q of electricity. An admissible strategy carries out the following sell at no loss constraint s j (c j (·), q) ≥ c j (q), ∀q ∈ Dom(c j ). (2.1)
A possible example of such strategy is s j (c j (·), q) = c j (q) or s j (c j (·), q) = c j (q)+λ(q), where λ(q) stands for any additional profit. The constraint (2.1) guarantees profitable trade and incorporates an aspect of profit maximization (ie, loss avoidance) into the market share approach. In what follows, we include this profit constraint in the considered class of admissible strategies.
We define the class of admissible strategy profiles on electricity market S as:
 s = (s 1 , . . . , s J ); s j : C j × R + −→ R + (c j (·), q) −→ s j (c j (·), q) such that s j (c j (·), q) ≥ c j (q), ∀q ∈ Dom(c j )
As a function of q, s j (c j (·), q) is bounded on Dom(c j ). For the sake of clarity, we define for each q ∈ Dom(c j ), s j (c j (·), q) = p lolc , where p lolc is the loss of load cost, chosen as any overestimation of the maximal production costs.
For producer j's strategy s j , we define the associated asking size at price p as O(c j (·), s j ; p) := sup{q, s j (c j (·), q) < p} (2.3)
with sup ∅ = 0. Hence O(c j (·), s j ; p) is the maximum quantity of electricity at unit price p supplied by producer j on the market. We also call p → O(c j (·), s j ; p) the offer function of producer j.
Remark 2.2.
(i) The asking size function p → O(c j (·), s j ; p) is, with respect to p, an non-decreasing surjection from [0, +∞) to [0, κ j ], right continuous and such that O(c j (·), s j ; 0) = 0. For a non-decreasing strategy s j , O(c j (·), s j ; .) is its generalized inverse function with respect to q.
(ii) Given two strategies q → s j (c j (·), q) and q → s j (c j (·), q) such that s j (c j (·), q) ≤ s j (c j (·), q), for all q ∈ Dom(c j ) we have for any positive p O(c j (·), s j ; p) ≥ O(c j (·), s j ; p).
Indeed, if p 1 ≥ p 2 then {q, s j (c j (·), q) ≤ p 2 } ⊂ {q, s j (c j (·), q) ≤ p 1 } from which we deduce that O(c j (·), s j ; ·) is non-decreasing. Next, if s j (c j (·), ·) ≤ s j (c j (·), ·), for any fixed p, we have {q, s j (c j (·), q) ≤ p} ⊂ {q, s j (c j (·), q) ≤ p} from which the reverse order follows for the requests.
We shall now describe the electricity market clearing. Note that from a market view point, the dependency of the supply with respect to the marginal cost does not need to be explicit. For the sake of clarity, we write s j (q) and O(s j ; p) instead of s j (c j (·), q) and O(c j (·), s j ; p). The dependency will be expressed explicitly whenever needed.
By aggregating the J asking size functions, we can define the overall asking function p → O O(s; p) a producer strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s J ) as:
Hence, for any producer strategy profile s, O O(s; p) is the quantity of electricity that can be sold on the market at unit price p.
The overall supply function
Electricity market clearing
Taking producer strategy profile s = (s 1 (·), . . . , s J (·)) the market sets the electricity market price p elec (s) together with the quantities (ϕ 1 (s), . . . , ϕ J (s)) of electricity sold by each producer. The market clearing price p elec (s) is the unit price paid to each producer for the quantities ϕ j (s) of electricity. The price p(s) may be defined as a price whereby supply satisfies demand. As we are working with a general non-increasing demand curve (possibly locally inelastic), the price that satisfies the demand is not necessarily unique. We thus define the clearing price generically with the following definition. 
with the convention that inf ∅ = p lolc . The clearing price may then be established as any p elec (s) ∈ [p(s),p(s)] as an output of a specific market clearing rule. To keep the price consistency, the market rule must be such that for any two strategy profiles s and s ,
Note that p(s) =p(s) only if the demand curve p → D(p) is constant on some intervals [p(s), p(s) + ]. In that case, p(s) corresponds to the best ask price, whilep(s) is the best bid price. The demand/offer curves that result from the buyer/seller aggregation in a given time period implies some market fixing rules that allocate buyer surplus and seller surplus. In that sense p elec (s) is a fixing price 1 . Note that p elec (s) = p(s) maximizes buyer surplus while p elec (s) =p(s) maximizes seller surplus. Note also that price p(s) is well defined in the case where demand does not strictly decrease. This includes the case where demand is constant. In such case, p(s) = p lolc only if the demand curve never crosses the supply.
Next, we define the quantity of electricity sold at price p elec (s).
) may occur, requiring the introduction of an auxiliary rule to share D(p elec (s)) among the producers that propose O O(s; p elec (s)). Note that in this last case, due to the clearing property (2.6) on p elec (·), we have
Hence the D(p elec (s)) is totally provided by producers with non null offer at price p(s). The rule of the market is to share D(p elec (s)) among these producers only. This gives an explicit priority to the best offer prices p(s).
where
and f (x − ) denotes the left value at x of a function f . The market's choice is to fully accept the asking size of producers with continuous asking size curve at point p(s). For producers with discontinuous asking size curve at p(s), a market rule based on proportionality that favors abundance is used to share the remaining part of the supply: any extra supply available at the clearing price O O(s; p(s)) − D(p(s)) is split among all generators offering at that price such that they each get the same percentage of their offered quantity allocated to production.
We summarize the market rule on quantities as follows.
Definition 2.4 (Clearing electricity quantities). The quantity ϕ j (s) of electricity sold by Producer j on the electricity market is
Carbon market
Let us recall the CO 2 regulation principle on which we base our analysis. Producers are penalized according to their emission level if they do not own allowances. Hence, in parallel to their position on the electricity market, producers buy CO 2 emission allowances on a separate CO 2 auction market. In the following, we formalize producer strategy on the CO 2 market only. If they are allowed to, producers buying permits on the CO 2 market will use them either to cap their own power production emissions, either to prevent other players from buying permits. The following assumption introduces some market design rules that control players behavior on that market. (i) The carbon market is capped and has a finite known quantity Ω of CO 2 emission allowances available.
(ii) Each producer j can buy a capped number of allowances E j , related to its own CO 2 emission capacity.
(iii) Emissions that are not covered by allowances are penalized at a unit rate p.
Note that if one chose E j ≥ Ω for all producers then item (ii) is void. Other choice for the E j can be seen as strengthen regulation tool.
On this market, producers adopt a strategy that consists of an offer function
is the quantity of allowances that producer j is ready to buy at price τ . This offer may not be a monotonic function. We denote A the strategy profile set on the CO 2 market,
The CO 2 market reacts by aggregating the J offers by
and the clearing market price is established following a second item auction 2 as:
Note that p CO 2 (A) = 0 indicates that there are too many allowances to sell. It is worth a reminder here that the aim of allowances is to decrease emissions. In section 3.2, we discuss a design hypothesis (Assumption 3.8) that guarantees an equilibrium price p CO 2 (A) > 0. Therefore, in the following, we assume that the overall quantity Ω of allowances, is such that p CO 2 (A) > 0.
Next, we define the amount of allowances bought at price p CO 2 (A) by the producers. By Definition (2.10), we have A A(p
> Ω, the CO 2 market must decide between the producers with an additional rule. We define
For a producer i, ∆(A i ) ≥ 0 means that its CO 2 demand does not decrease if the price increases. It is therefore ready to pay more to obtain the quantity of allowances it is asking for at price p CO 2 (A). The CO 2 market gives priority to this kind of producer, which will be fully served. The producers such that ∆(A j ) < 0 share the remaining allowances. This can be written as follows.
Each producers with A j (p CO 2 (A)) > 0 obtains the following quantity δ j (A) of allowances
otherwise.
(2.11)
Carbon and electricity market coupling
In the following, we formalize the coordination of a producer's strategy on the CO 2 and electricity markets. This could be seen as if both markets were synchronized during a single time period with the same length (eg, one hour). As mentioned earlier, for each producer, the marginal cost function is parametrized by the positions A of the producers on the carbon market. Indeed, producer j can obtain CO 2 emission allowances on the market to avoid penalization for (some of) its emissions. Those emissions that are not covered by allowances are penalized at a unit rate p.
A profile of an offer to buy from the producers A = (A 1 , . . . , A J ), through the CO 2 market clearing, corresponds to a unit price of p CO 2 (A) of the allowance and quantities δ j (A) of allowances bought by each producer (defined by the market rules (2.10),(2.11)).
This yields to the following modified marginal production cost function 3 c A j (·), parametrized by the emission regulations:
where for all producers {j = 1, . . . , J},
• q → e j (q) is the emission rate (originally in CO 2 t/Mwh),
is the electricity capacity covered by the bought allowances δ j (A) ≤ E j :
In this coupled market setting, the strategy of producer j thus makes a pair (A j , s j ). The set of admissible strategy profile is defined as
where in the definition of S in (2.2), we use
(2.14)
Prices for allowances and electricity, p CO 2 ((A, s)) and p elec ((A, s)), quantities of allowances bought by each producer, δ j ((A, s)) and market shares on electricity market ϕ j ((A, s)) of each producer corresponds to any strategy profile (A, s) ∈ Σ Σ, through the market mechanisms described.
Nash Equilibrium analysis
We suppose that the J producers behave non-cooperatively, aiming at maximizing their individual market share on the electricity market. For a strategy profile (A, s) ∈ Σ Σ, the market share of a producer j depends upon its strategy (A j , s j (·)) but also on the strategies (A −j , s −j ) of the other producers 4 . In this set-up the natural solution is the Nash equilibrium (see e.g. [1] ). More precisely we are looking for a strategy profile (A * , s * ) = ((A that satisfies Nash equilibrium conditions: none of the producers would strictly benefit, that is, would strictly increase its market share from a unilateral deviation. Namely, for any producer j strategy (A j , s j ) such that
where ϕ j is the quantity of electricity sold. Note that the dependency in terms of A through the marginal cost c A j is now made explicit in ϕ j . Condition (3.1) has to be satisfied for any unilateral deviation of any producer j. In particular (3.1) has to be satisfied for a producer j admissible deviation
where producer j would only change its behavior on the electricity market.
The electricity strategy component s * of the Nash equilibrium (A * , s * ) is also a Nash equilibrium for the restricted electricity game, where producers only behave on the electricity market with marginal electricity production costs c
The next section focuses on determining a Nash equilibrium on the game restricted to the electricity market.
Equilibrium on the power market
In this restricted set-up, we consider that the marginal costs {c j , j = 1 . . . , J} are known data, possibly fixed through the position A on the CO 2 market. In this section, we refer to S as the set of admissible strategy profiles, in the particular case where C j = {c j } for each j = 1, . . . , J.
The Nash equilibrium problem is as follows:
The following proposition exhibits a Nash equilibrium, whereby each producer must choose the strategy denoted by C j , and referred to as marginal production cost strategy. It is defined by
(i) For any strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s J ), no producer j ∈ {1, . . . , J} can be penalized by deviating from strategy s j to its marginal production cost strategy C j , namely,
In other words, for any producer j, C j is a dominant strategy.
(ii) The strategy profile C = (C 1 , . . . C J ) is a Nash equilibrium.
(iii) If the strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium, then we havep(s) =p(C), and for any producer j, ϕ j (s) = ϕ j (C).
Point (ii) exhibits a Nash equilibrium strategy profile as a direct consequence of the dominance property (i). Clearly the Nash equilibrium is non-unique, since we can easily show that a producer's given supply can follow from countless different strategies. Nevertheless point (iii) shows that there is a unique associated quantities of electricity sold by producers. The market coupling mechanism that we propose in the following section is based on this uniqueness property which allows the computation of the equilibrium shares on electricity and carbon markets. Moreover, any Nash equilibrium price evolves in the interval p elec (s) ∈ [p(C),p(C)], which reduces to the point {p(C)} in various situations, in particular when D(·) strictly decreases at p(C), or when p elec is chosen equal top.
Proofs of (i) and (iii), which are rather tedious due to non-strictly monotony and possible discontinuity of supply and offers, are postponed to Appendix A.1.
Coupled market design using the Nash equilibrium
From this point we restrict our attention to a particular market design. In the following, the scope of the analysis applies to a special class of producers, a specific electricity market price clearing (satisfying Definition 2.3) and a range of quantities Ω of allowances available on the CO 2 market. Although not necessary, the following restriction simplifies the development. Assumption 3.3. On the producers. Each producer j operates a single production unit, for which (i) the initial marginal cost contribution (that does not depend on the producer positions A in the CO 2 market) is constant, q → c j (q) = c j . The related emission rate q → e j (q) = e j is also assumed to be a positive constant,
(ii) the producers are different pairwise:
In what follows (according to Assumption 2.5), in order to limit the number of parameters involved in the discussion, the maximal cap of allowances that each producer j may buy is set to E j = e j κ j . This arbitrary but natural choice does not penalize producers capacity level, and does not bring any restriction to the following equilibrium analysis.
As a consequence of Assumption 3.3, the marginal production cost in (2.12) can simply be written as
For a given strategy profile on the electricity market, Definition 2.3 gives a range of possible determinations for the electricity price. Previously, the analysis of the Nash Equilibrium restricted to the electricity market did not require a precise clearing price determination. Nevertheless to extend our analysis to the coupling we need to make explicit this determination and assume the following: Assumption 3.4. On the electricity market. For a given strategy profile s of the producers, the clearing price of electricity is p elec (s). The market rule fixes p elec (·) =p(·) or p elec (·) = p(·) as defined in (2.5).
We will illustrate below that this choice of clearing price ensures the increasing behavior of p elec (·) and right continuity in terms of the carbon price (see Lemma 3.6) .
The quantity Ω of CO 2 allowances available plays a crucial role in the market design. If this quantity is too high, the allowance's market price will drop to zero, leaving the market incapable of fulfilling its role of decreasing CO 2 emissions. Therefore we clearly need to make an assumption that restricts the number of allowances available. Appropriately capping the maximum quantity of allowances available requires information on which producers are willing to obtain allowances. This is the objective of the following paragraph where we define a willing to buy function that plays a central role in the analysis of Nash equilibria.
Willing to buy functions
In this paragraph, we aim at guessing a Nash equilibrium candidate. We base our reasoning on the dominant strategies on the electricity market alone (see Proposition 3.2). Remark 3.1 allows us to fix the electricity market strategy as a marginal production cost strategy, given the marginal cost functions C A = {c A j , j = 1, . . . J} imposed by the output of the CO 2 clearing, as in (3.5).
In particular, when A ∈ A, we observe that the strategies (A, {c A j , j = 1, . . . J}) are in the set of admissible strategies defined in (2.13).
From now on, all the strategy profiles that we consider on the carbon market are assumed to be admissible.
In the following, as the discussion will mainly focus on the impact of strategies A through the carbon market, we denote the electricity market output as:
To begin with, we consider an exogenous CO 2 cost τ similar to a CO 2 tax rate: the producers' marginal cost becomes for any
In this tax framework, the dominant strategy on the electricity market is also parametrized by τ as C τ = {c τ j , j = 1, . . . J} defined in (3.3). The clearing electricity price and quantities follow as
Price p elec (τ ) will be referred to as the taxed electricity price, by contrast with price p elec (A) issued from the marginal production cost strategy that results from the position A on the carbon market.
Remark 3.5. Considering a carbon tax τ and a carbon market strategy A such that τ = p CO 2 (A), we emphasize the fact that the corresponding electricity prices are not equivalent, but we always have the following inequality
This follows from the fact that for all i,
The gap between C τ (·) and C A (·) comes both from the width (Ω effect) and the height (penalty effect) of their steps.
We start with the following: Lemma 3.6. Under Assumption 3.4, the map τ → p elec (τ ) is non-decreasing and right continuous.
We determine the willing-to-buy-allowances functions W j (·) and W(·), as follows:
(3.8)
For producer j, W j is the quantity of emissions it would produce under the penalization τ , and consequently the quantity of allowances it would be ready to buy at price τ . Given the CO 2 value τ , the total amount W(τ ) represents the allowances needed to cover the global emissions generated by the players who have won electricity market shares. We also define the functions
Given that the CO 2 value τ , W(τ ) is the amount of allowances needed by the producers who have won electricity market shares and want to cover their overall production capacity κ j . Obviously we have
Moreover, Lemma 3.7. The function τ → W(τ ) is non-increasing:
The proofs of both Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 can be found in Appendix A.2.
Towards an equilibrium strategy
The main result of the section is the computation of the bounds of the interval in which the coupled carbon market Nash equilibria prices evolve: we demonstrate that there is no possible deviation enabling a Nash equilibrium carbon price outside this interval. The price bounds are elaborated as specific carbon prices associated to two explicit strategies, build from the willing-to-buy-allowances functions: the Lower price strategy, and the Higher price strategy. In order to characterize further Nash equilibria candidates, evolving in this price interval, we analyze a third set of strategies that are intermediate strategies.
Those strategies rely on our last design assumption which prevents the carbon market from market failure:
Assumption 3.8. On the carbon market design. The available allowances Ω satisfy
Moreover, p is chosen such that no producer is sidelined from the game: for all j, τ → W j (τ ) is not identically zero on [0, p].
Assumption 3.8 allows to define two prices of particular interest for the game analysis:
and
Observe that we always have τ lower ≤ τ higher .
Lower price through lower price strategy Lemma 3.9. Consider any strategy
(3.12)
(ii) In the case where p CO 2 (A W ) = τ lower , there is no unilateral favorable deviation that clears the market at a CO 2 price lower than τ lower .
We call the Lower price strategy (W 1 , . . . , W J ), as p CO 2 ((W 1 , . . . , W J )) = τ lower by price definitions (2.10) and (3.10).
Proof. Point (i) is a consequence of the definition of
To prove (ii), first note that, since we assume p Suppose one producer, say Producer 1, deviates and chooses
, the others j = 1 produce at least electricity for the allowances they have,
Since the demand is decreasing we have
, the offer of Producer 1 based on his penalized marginal production cost is also greater than
Lemma 3.10. Suppose A is such that p CO 2 (A) < τ lower . Then A is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. To prove this lemma we exhibit an unilateral favorable deviation of a producer. a) Assume first that at least one producer exists, say Producer 1, such that ϕ 1 (A) < κ 1 and there exists a tax valueτ 1 such that p CO 2 (A) <τ 1 ≤ τ lower and, W 1 (τ ) = e 1 κ 1 for any τ ∈ [p CO 2 (A),τ 1 ]. This means that Producer 1 may sell κ 1 , for any tax level τ in [p CO 2 (A),τ 1 ], and consequently we have
Consider a deviation A 1 of player 1, such that the resulting clearing price on CO 2 market, p
From Remark 3.5, we have
This means that Producer 1 may sell its overall covered capacity:
Now we define τ → A 1 (τ ) as follows, for ε > 0 arbitrarily small and p CO 2 (A) ≤ τ ,
Note that
, and we get our favorable deviation.
If
, we observe that when ∆(A 1 ) ≥ 0, we also have ∆( A 1 ) = 0. Then by the CO 2 market clearing mechanism, Producer 1 gets e 1 κ 1 allowances instead of δ(A) and strictly improves its electricity market share. when ∆(A 1 ) < 0, we have
, that also insures that Producer 1 increases δ(A −1 , A 1 ) > δ(A) (see (2.11)). b) Assume now that all producers are either such that ϕ j (A) = κ j or such that ϕ j (A) < κ j and W j (p CO 2 (A) + ) < e j κ j . Among the second category, there exists at least one producer (say Producer 1) such that ϕ 1 (A) < ϕ 1 (p CO 2 (A)) with ϕ 1 (p CO 2 (A)) > 0 (unless to contradict p CO 2 (A) < τ lower ). Here we have used the notation (3.6) and (3.7).
A strictly favorable deviation A 1 of Producer 1, thus consists in increasing its ask at the price p CO 2 (A) + , in order to increase its δ(A −1 , A 1 ) (see (2.11)):
, for ε sufficiently small. This last inequality guarantees that δ 1 (A −1 , A 1 ) > δ 1 (A) and finally ϕ 1 (p
Higher price through higher price strategy Lemma 3.11. Consider any strategy
(ii) There is no unilateral favorable deviation that clears the market at a CO 2 price higher than τ higher .
We call the Higher price strategy (W 1 , . . . , W J ), as p CO 2 ((W 1 , . . . , W J )) = τ higher by price definitions (2.10) and (3.11).
Proof. Point (i) follows directly from the definition of τ higher .
To prove (ii), suppose one producer, say Producer 1, chooses its strategy A 1 (·) instead of A W 1 (·), and that the resulting CO 2 price is τ := p CO 2 (A W −1 , A 1 ) > τ higher . Necessarily, due to the definition of A W , this means that W 1 ( τ ) = 0, which in turn means that c 1 + τ e 1 > p elec ( τ ). To conclude, it is sufficient to notice that any Producer j = 1 obtains what he asks for, i.e. δ j (A W −1 , A 1 ) = W j ( τ + ), from which it follows that the coupled electricity price equals the taxed electricity price: p elec (A W −1 , A 1 ) = p elec ( τ ), and then ϕ 1 (A W −1 , A 1 ) = W i ( τ ) = 0 and the deviation of 1 is not favorable.
A strategy A is said to be effective if all the producers that bought some allowances produce some electricity:
Lemma 3.12.
(i) Let A admissible such that p CO 2 (A) > τ higher . Then A is not an effective strategy.
(ii) Let A admissible such that p CO 2 (A) > τ higher . Then A is not a strong Nash equilibrium.
As a consequence of this lemma, if a producer (or a set of producers) that does not produce electricity, tries to block the auction game of the carbon market by buying all the allowances he can, then there always exists a coalition with favorable deviation.
Proof. (i).
Effective means that for all producers such that δ j (A) > 0, we have W j (p CO 2 (A)) = e j κ j , which is clearly in contradiction with the definition of τ higher .
(ii). Given A, such that p CO 2 (A) > τ higher , we consider the coalition of producers K such that for j ∈ K, W j (p CO 2 (A)) = 0. K is clearly non-empty by definition of τ higher . Consider the following cooperating deviation of K:
, and at least for one member of the coalition K,
which is a strictly favorable deviation of j, whereas the situation is unchanged for the others in K that still produce nothing. Thus, we exhibit a coalition that allows a deviation from A that benefits to all of its members, and that benefits strictly to at least one. Then A is not a strong Nash equilibrium.
Price interval
From Lemmas 3.10 and 3.12, we have the following: Corollary 3.13. If A is a strong Nash equilibrium, or if it is an effective Nash equilibrium, then p
The interval in which the coupled carbon market Nash equilibria prices evolve is then [τ lower , τ higher ]. This price range is generated by the existing gap between the functions W(·) and W(·).
Thus a condition for a single unique carbon price is that this gap shrinks to zero: the equality between the two willing-to-buy-allowances functionals occurs i.e. for any value τ , and any producer i, the allowances needed to cover the global emissions generated by a player who has won electricity market shares and the allowances needed by a producer who has won electricity market shares and wants to cover its overall production capacity are the same. Clearly, this is very unlikely to happen.
It is worth of mentioning that the same lemmas apply when producers have an electricity production power plants portfolio, or when one modifies the maximal cap E j of allowances that each producer j may buy while one redefines τ → W j (τ ) by
Note that if one increases the maximal cap, τ higher increases.
Intermediate strategies
Consider any strategy profile B = (B 1 , · · · , B J ) satisfying the following:
for τ > τ higher .
(3.14)
This is not in general an equilibrium, nevertheless we have the following properties:
Lemma 3.14.
(ii) If there exists a favorable deviation from a producer, say Producer 1, that chooses B 1 instead of B 1 , such that p CO 2 (B −1 , B 1 ) < τ lower , then there exists another favorable deviation B 1 defined by
Proof. Point (i) follows directly from Lemma 3.9-(i) and Lemma 3.11-(i).
To prove (ii), we first observe that, as producers j = 1 are served first on the carbon market,
Moreover, we have p CO 2 (B −1 , B 1 ) = τ lower , and from the CO 2 market mechanism it follows that
Indeed, for strategy (B −1 , B 1 ), the producers j = 1 such that B j (τ lower + ) < W j (τ lower ) receive a quantity of quotas δ j (B −1 , B 1 ) ≤ W j (τ lower ), from which δ 1 (B −1 , B 1 ) = Ω − j δ j (B −1 , B 1 ) ≥ δ 1 (B −1 , B 1 ) . We also deduce that ϕ 1 (B −1 , B 1 ) = 1 e 1 δ 1 (B −1 , B 1 ). To conclude, it is sufficient to notice that ϕ 1 (B −1 , B 1 ) =
The following aims to characterize the form of effective Nash equilibria.
Corollary 3.15. Let E be an effective Nash equilibrium (i.e p CO 2 (E) ≤ τ higher ). Then the following E is also an effective Nash equilibrium:
(3.15)
Proof. From Lemmas 3.9 and 3.11, p CO 2 (E) ∈ [τ lower , τ higher ]. Consider a deviation that produces a bigger carbon price: Producer 1 deviates from E 1 toẼ 1 with p CO 2 (Ẽ 1 , E −1 ) > τ higher . Then by definition of τ higher , ϕ 1 (Ẽ 1 , E −1 ) = 0. Indeed, a deviation to this bigger price is possible only if W 1 (p CO 2 ((Ẽ 1 , E −1 )) = 0. Now if Producer 1 deviates from E 1 toẼ 1 with p CO 2 ((Ẽ 1 , E −1 )) < τ lower , and if we assume that this deviation is strictly favorable: ϕ 1 (Ẽ 1 , E −1 ) > ϕ 1 (E ). Then according to Lemma 3.14, we considerÊ 1 that gives p CO 2 (Ê 1 , E −1 ) = τ lower . And we still have that ϕ 1 (Ê 1 , E −1 ) > ϕ 1 (E ). But the deviation (Ê 1 , E −1 ) from E produces the same price and shares than (Ê 1 , E −1 )). Since we also have ϕ 1 (E ) = ϕ 1 (E), we get a strictly favorable deviation to E which gives the contradiction.
Same arguments apply when Producer 1 deviates from E 1 toẼ 1 with p
Conclusion
Once CO 2 is emitted into the atmosphere, it remains there for more than a century. Estimating its value is an essential indicator for efficiently defining policy. Carbon valuation is crucial for designing markets that foster emission reductions. In this paper, we established the links between an electricity market and a carbon auction market through an analysis of electricity producers' strategies. We proved that they lead to the interval where relevant Nash equilibria evolve, enabling the computation of equilibrium prices on both markets. For each producer, each equilibrium derives the level of electricity produced and the CO 2 emissions covered. For a given design and set of players, the information provided by the interval may be interpreted as a diagnosis of market behavior in terms of prices and volume. Indeed, it enables the computation of the CO 2 emissions actually released, and opens the discussion of a relevant carbon market in terms of mitigation issues.
In addition to this analysis of the Nash equilibrium we plan to analyze the electricity production mix, with a particular focus on renewable shares that do not participate in emissions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
A. First we prove the dominance property (i).
Suppose that one producer, let us say producer 1, deviates and chooses C 1 instead of s 1 . We have to show that its market share cannot be reduced by this deviation. By definition of the admissibility (see (2.2)) we have
Hence the offer functions defined by (2.3) satisfy O(s 1 ; ·) ≤ O (C 1 ; ·) . By adding the unchanged offers of the other producers
where (s −1 , C 1 ) denotes the strategy profile that includes Producer 1 deviation. The minimum market clearing price (2.5) for strategy profile s is
The minimum market clearing price (2.5) for strategy profile (s −1 , C 1 ) is
The inequality (A.1) together with the fact that the demand D(·) is a non-increasing function imply that
, from which, with (2.6) we deduce that
Now let us show that Producer 1 does not reduce its market share by deviating from
For the sake of clarity we adopt, in this paragraph, the following notation:
We first consider the case where p sC < p s . By definition of the minimum clearing price p sC , the fact that
From the market clearing (2.8) we get
According to Definition 2.4, let us denote
We have
Since p elec sC ≤ p elec s we get
is non-decreasing ans since we have assumed p sC < p s , we get
For such j > 1 we thus have
Now consider the case where p s = p sC := p.
Due to the market rule (2.6), we necessarily have
, then by the market clearing
, by the market clearing we get
From (2.7), we have for j ∈ E(p)
Hence, if E(p) is non empty then at least one producer exists, j = 1 such that ∆ − O(s j ; p) > 0. and from the desegregation of O O and definition of ∆ − it results that
We note that
and that
This follows from the fact that when A ≤ B, the map x → A − x B − x is decreasing on [0, A).
B. We prove the uniqueness property (iii): all Nash equilibria induce the same electricity price and same quantities of electricity bought to each producer. First, we state the following consequence of the dominance property (i):
Lemma A.1. For any admissible strategy s = (s 1 , . . . , s J ), such that p(s) = p(C), if producer j is such that s j = C j , then ϕ j (s) ≥ ϕ j (C).
Proof. As arguments are very similar to the proof of (i), we just sketch them. Let s such that p(s) = p(C) := p. Assume that Producer 1 is such that s 1 = C 1 .
•
Thus,
Assuming that ∆ − O(C 1 ; p) > 0, we note that
We prove that the quantities are the same for all Nash equilibria. Let w an other Nash equilibrium that differs from C. On the global offers we always have O O(w; ·) ≤ O O(C; ·) that implies p(w) ≥ p(C). Note that when p(C) = p lolc , all admissible strategies s are Nash as ϕ j (C) = ϕ j (s) = κ j , for all j.
By the offers ordering, it is straightforward to show that
Assume that the quantities are not the same, then there exists a producer, say Producer 1, such that ϕ 1 (w) < ϕ 1 (C). And we also have
If p(C) = p(w −1 , C 1 ), then by Lemma A.1, we have that ϕ 1 (w −1 , C 1 ) ≥ ϕ 1 (C) and hence ϕ 1 (w −1 , C 1 ) > ϕ 1 (w). In other words, w has a strictly favorable deviation for Producer 1 that contradicts the assumption that w is a Nash equilibrium. Now if p(C) < p(w −1 , C 1 ), by (2.9),
and the same conclusion follows.
We prove that the equilibrium best bid price is unique:p(w) =p(C), for an other Nash equilibrium w. Assume the contrary,p(w) >p(C). Then by the definition ofp(·), we have that D(p(w)) < D(p(C)). From (2.8) and (2.9),
that contradicts the fact that Nash equilibria have same clearing quantities.
A.2 Proofs of Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7
Proof of Lemma 3.6.
Although the result of this lemma is intuitive, the proof is rather technical. This is due to our assumptions, in particular regarding demand, that allow the demand function to have discontinuity points and some nonelasticity areas (see Assumption 2.1).
More precisely, if we define the map
then we can observe that, for any p > 0 far enough from the c i , and any τ ≥ τ ,
, the set of discontinuity points of the Demand function.
We call S κ = {p c ; D(p c ) = κ i }, the set of prices that make demand coincide with some accumulation of production capacities.
We observe that p elec (τ ) ∈ {c i + τ e i , i = 1, . . . , j} ∪ S D ∪ S κ . In particular, from Definition 2.3,
Now we prove the right continuity of τ → p(τ ). Let us fix a τ .
This means that p(τ ) is of the form c + τ , for a given . Then when > 0 is small enough, we also have p(τ + ) = c + (τ + )e . Indeed, D(c + (τ + )e ) ≤ D(c + τ e ) and for a small enough ,
Thus, D(c + (τ + )e ) < O O(τ + ; c + (τ + )e ) which implies that p(τ ) + e = c + (τ + )e ≥ p(τ + ) and hence e ≥ p(τ + ) − p(τ ).
(ii) We consider next the case
This means that p(τ ) ∈ S D is at a discontinuity point, say p d of the demand, p(τ ) = p d . Then, for any
and we can choose δ to be small enough so that τ =
. Then, for a small enough ,
which implies that p(τ ) + δ ≥p(τ + ), so we obtain
This means that p(τ ) ∈ S κ , say p(τ ) = p c Then, for any δ > 0,
and we can choose δ small enough such that τ = pc+δ−c i e i
. Then, for small enough,
The right-continuity of τ →p(τ ) follows, by definition asp(τ ) is a continuous transformation of p(τ ).
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 3.7.
The proof consists in a complete analysis of the entire combination of situations, but each situation is elementary. Let us suppose the opposite, that is there exists 0 ≤ t < t ≤ p such that the emission levels are
We define the function τ → I(τ ) valued in the subsets of {1, . . . , J} that lists the producers in the electricity market producing at tax level τ :
In particular we have for all τ ∈ [0, p],
(i) We first examine the situation I(t ) = I(t).
To shorten the expressions, we adopt the following shortened notation I(t) = I and I(t ) = I .
(i-a) If i∈I ϕ i (t) = D(t) then, from the demand constraint (DC) and the emission levels hypothesis (EH), we have
We denote by I the subset of I of index such that c i + te i = p(t). In particular, when j ∈ I \ I, then ϕ j (t) = κ j . Note that there exists at most one index (say ) in the set I ∩ I . If j ∈ I \ I and k ∈ I \ I, then, by the definition of the sets c j + e j t = c + e t, c k + e k t < c j + e j t, c j + e j t < c + e t , c k + e k t = c + e t , c j + e j t < c k + e k t, c k + e k t < c + e t, from which, we easily deduce that
Now we decompose the sets I and I in the demand constraint (DC) and the emission levels hypothesis (EH) as follows:
After simplification, we obtain
e ϕ (t) + i∈ I\ I e i ϕ i (t) + k∈ I \ I e k κ k < e ϕ (t ) + i∈ I\ I
Assume first that ϕ (t) + i∈ I\ I ϕ i (t) ≥ ϕ (t ) + i∈ I\ I κ i . Equivalently, we have
and from (A.4), e ϕ (t) − ϕ (t ) ≥ i∈ I\ I e i (κ i − ϕ i (t)).
By combining the above with the emission levels hypothesis (EH), we obtain the following contradiction:
k∈ I \ I e k κ k < k∈ I \ I e k ϕ k (t ). Assume now that ϕ (t)+ i∈ I\ I ϕ i (t) < ϕ (t )+ i∈ I\ I κ i . Multiplying the demand constraint (DC) byê := min{e k , k ∈ I \ I}, we get k∈ I \ I e k (κ k − ϕ k (t )) ≥ê ϕ (t) − ϕ (t ) +ê i∈ I\ I (κ i − ϕ i (t)).
But from (EH) and (A.4), we also have k∈ I \ I e k (κ k − ϕ k (t )) < e ϕ (t) − ϕ (t ) + e i∈ I\ I (κ i − ϕ i (t)), then 0 ≥ (ê − e ) ϕ (t) − ϕ (t ) + (ê − e ) i∈ I\ I (κ i − ϕ i (t)), which contradicts our assumption. (i-b) If i∈I ϕ i (t) < D(t) then, for all i ∈ I, ϕ i (t) = κ i and (EH) is necessarily false.
(ii) We examine the situation I(t ) = I(t)
We add the following shortened notation: I(t) ∩ I (t) = I I . We break down I and I into the sets I I , I\I and I \I. We denote by I the set of index i ∈ I such that c i + te i = p(t). In particular, when j ∈ I\ I, then ϕ j (t) = κ j .
We first derive some generic relations between the emission rates for these. Among the indexes in the set I I , we observe that at most one index exists (say ) in the set I ∩ I . If j ∈ I\ I , if k ∈ I \ I, then, by the definition of the sets c j + e j t = c + e t, c k + e k t < c j + e j t, c j + e j t < c + e t , c k + e k t = c + e t , c j + e j t < c k + e k t, c k + e k t < c + e t, from which, we easily deduce that e := max e j , j ∈ I I ∩ I\ I < e < min e k , k ∈ I I ∩ I \ I :=ê . (A.9) j∈I\I e j ϕ j (t) + e ϕ + i∈ I\ I ∩ I I e i ϕ i (t) < e κ + i∈ I\ I ∩ I I e i κ i + k∈I \I e k κ k .
Then we multiply (DC) byē := (e ,ê) ∨ max{e k , k ∈ I \I}, and we obtain by (A.11) j∈I\I e j ϕ j (t) +ēϕ +ē i∈ I\ I ∩ I I ϕ i (t) >ēκ +ē i∈ I\ I ∩ I I κ i + k∈I \I e k κ k .
We subtract with (EH) :
(ē − e )ϕ + i∈ I\ I ∩ I I (ē − e i )ϕ i (t) > (ē − e )κ + i∈ I\ I ∩ I I (ē − e i )κ i .
Butē ≥ e when exists, andē ≥ê ≥ e i for i ∈ I\ I ∩ I I . So we obtain our contradiction.
(ii-a-2) If i∈I ϕ i (t ) = D(p elec (t )), then j∈I\I ϕ j (t) + i∈ I I ϕ i (t) > i∈ I I 
Butê < e <ê , and the contradiction follows. If does not exist, thenē =ê ∨ max{e k , k ∈ I \I} i∈ I \ I∩ I I (ē − e i ) κ i − ϕ i (t ) > i∈ I\ I ∩ I I (ē − e i ) (κ i − ϕ i (t)) , i∈ I \ I∩ I I (ē −ê ) κ i − ϕ i (t ) > i∈ I\ I ∩ I I (ē −ê) (κ i − ϕ i (t)) .
(A.27)
But max{e k , k ∈ I \I} <ê , and the contradiction follows.
(ii-b) If i∈I ϕ i (t) < D(p elec (t)) then for all i ∈ I, ϕ i (t) = κ i .
(ii-b 1) If i∈I ϕ i (t ) < D(p elec (t )), then ϕ i (t ) = κ i for all i ∈ I . Moreover, we have that O O(t, p(t)) ≥ D(p(t)) + ε) ≥ D(p(t )) > O O(t , p(t )) and (DC)-(EH) becomes
j∈I\I e j κ j < k∈I \I e k κ k .
Then, we multiply (DC) by min{e j ; j ∈ I\I } ≥ max{e k ; k ∈ I \I}, and we obtain a contradiction with (EH).
(ii-b-2) If i∈I ϕ i (t ) = D(p elec (t )), we go back to the analysis of the case (ii-a-2), with the main difference that all quantities ϕ i (t) are now equal to κ i . We go to inequalities (A.26) and (A.27) which are simplified as the right-had sides are now zero. The contradiction follows with the same arguments.
